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SUMMARY 
Generally, traditional "marriages" according to Islamic custom are void in 
South African law because they are potentially polygynous and do not 
comply with the formalities prescribed by the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 . A 
valid concern for those who oppose polygyny is that it may enforce and 
promote gender inequality in that it is practised in patriarchal Muslim 
societies. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
contains numerous provisions aimed at combating gender inequalities, and 
these could be used to justify the policy of non-recognition. On the other 
hand, the Constitution has ushered in an era of tolerance and empathy; and 
the equality and religion clauses could be used to ensure that polygynous 
marriages are no longer ignored. 
This study will examine the tensions between Muslim personal law and 
clauses in the Constitution which have led to calls for the reformation and 
codification of Muslim personal law. 
Key Terms 
Muslim marriages; Recognition; Polygyny (Polygamy); Gender-equality; 
, Constitution; Freedom of Religion; Muslim personal laws; Codification; 
Patriarchy; Recognition of religiously-based personal laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the position of Muslim marriages 
in South Africa, and to determine, particularly, in the light of the constitutional 
commitment to equality and religious freedom, whether that position should 
change. 
There are two large groups of persons in South Africa who practise religions 
that permit polygyny, namely the Muslim and Hindu communities. 1 Polygyny 
is an anthropological term that refers to the practice of a husband having 
more than one wife.2 In South African law a polygynous marriage is contra 
bonos mores and invalid.3 A potentially polygynous marriage, one which is 
"celebrated under tenets which do not forbid the plurality of spouses, 
whether or not ... one party has in fact a plurality of spouses"4 , is also invalid. 
It must be noted that despite being void, polygynous marriages have certain 
legal consequences attached to them. For example, a Muslim marriage is 
recognised for the purposes of insolvency and income tax.5 Interestingly, our 
courts have attached certain legal consequences to the marriages in the 
above-mentioned areas for the sake of "expediency".6 If the State can profit 
from your marriage then it is recognised. The consequences of non-
recognition can be invidious, particularly for the wife. 
The bill of fundamental human rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act7 provides the perfect opportunity to re-evaluate 
the position of Muslim marriages. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Although this dissertation focuses on the Islamic faith as a system of religion which 
recognises polygyny, the same principles apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Hindu faith. 
Kaganas and Murray 1991 Acta Juridica at 119. 
Seedat's Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 at 307-309. 
Kahn in Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife 1975 at 601. 
Moosa 1995 Stellenbosch Law Review at 419-420. 
Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) at 1024 B. 
Act 108 of 1996. 
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Polygyny cannot be ignored when the rights granted to religious groups in 
this country are defined and interpreted. The relationship between Muslim 
women and the struggle for gender equality must also be analysed. 
While there is justifiable concern for the position of Muslim women involved 
in polygynous unions, it is sometimes overlooked that the inequalities 
present in the polygynous relationship have to do with the patriarchal society 
in which polygyny thrives, rather than the practice of polygyny itself.8 
What is more, it is not entirely clear what aspect of a potentially polygynous 
marriage is supposed to offend against the principle of gender equality. 
Many writers on Islamic jurisprudence, for instance, are of the opinion that 
Islam and gender equality are not necessarily in conflict.9 
It would seem that actually polygynous marriages are rare and on the 
decline, 10 but this does not mean that the status quo of non-recognition 
should be maintained until polygyny dies out completely. Parties continue to 
approach the courts for relief from the harsh consequences of non-
recognition.11 
Reaction to the challenges posed by modern concern with human rights, 
particularly as it relates to the status of women, has led Muslim religious 
bodies and legal experts to organise themselves towards invoking their 
constitutional right to be governed by the personal and family laws laid down 
by their faith. The very fact that the South African Law Commission 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Kagan as and Murray op. cit. note 2 at 127. 
Cachalia 1993 THRHR at 403. 
The suggested causes of the decline of polygyny are numerous and varied. (See, 
for example, Kaganas and Murray (op.cit. note 2) at 131; Simons African Women: 
Their Legal Status In South Africa 1968 at 79; Beck and Keddie (eds.) Women In 
The Muslim World 1979 at 49-50; 58). 
See Kalla and Another v The Master and Others 1994 (4) BCLR 79 (T) which was 
one of the first cases to be decided on the retrospectivity of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993; see also Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 
(C). 
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examined Muslim personal law with a view to its possible implementation, 
confirms this. 
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CHAPTER 1 
POL YGYNY AND MUSLIM MARRIAGES 
Marriage in Muslim society is a private contract in civil law, not a 
sacrament. 12 The contract grants the man certain rights over the woman. In 
return she receives "a bridal gift, support according to her station and the 
right to respectful treatment". 13 The Quran permits a man to have up to four 
wives at a time provided that he treats his wives equally in all respects. The 
"Verse of polygyny" in the Quran states: 
"Marry women of your choice, two, or three, or 
four, but if you fear that you shall not be able to 
deal justly (with them) then only one."14 
1.1 The Religious Nature Of Muslim Law 
The followers of Islam believe that Allah's revelations are binding in a 
religious and a judicial sense. These revelations are taken from, inter a/ia, 
the Quran. 15 Unlike the period of the Reformation in Europe, no separation 
between state and church took place in Islamic history,16 and for the Muslim 
there is no distinction between law and religion: 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
"The divine nature of Shari'a (Islamic law) denies 
the existence of any legislative authority on earth, 
conceding at most the capacity of political 
authorities to make administrative regulations to 
procure the implementation of the Shari'a."17 
Bulbulia 1983 De Rebus at 430. 
Amelunxen in Veenhoven (ed) 1975 A World Survey in Human Rights Case Studies 
1 at 87. 
Quran IV:3. 
Amelunxen op.cit. note 13 at 86. 
Cachalia op.cit. note 9 at 400. 
Hodkinson Muslim Family Law: A Sourcebook 1984 1-2 quoted by Bekker 1991 Acta 
Juridica at 6. 
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The Muslim people will therefore not accept a law which purports to 
unqualifiedly criticise or outlaw a practice that is provided for in the Quran.18 
1.2 Justification For Polygyny In Traditional Muslim Society 
The traditional justification for polygyny is the sexual satisfaction of the 
husband.19 Simons20 points out that a plurality of wives in Muslim society, 
unlike in African society, was not a source of economic gain since the man 
wealthy enough to afford more than one wife had his lands cultivated by 
slaves or hired workers; his wives simply "widened the range of legitimate 
sexual satisfaction" and added to the man's prestige. Other authors,21 
however, feel that the justification for polygyny in Muslim society are similar 
to those associated with African customary marriages. Poulter22 states that 
these include the fact that polygyny is encountered primarily in Third World 
countries where social welfare is limited or non-existent. People are 
therefore dependant on their relatives for support in times of sickness, old 
age or famine, and the wider the family circle, the greater the support. He23 
points out that polygyny increases the prospects of having numerous 
children which adds to the prestige of the father and ensures an heir to 
continue his line. 
1.3 The Position Of Women In Traditional Muslim Society 
Of some 100 verses dealing with women's issues in the Quran, only a few 
are devoted to the Islamic status of women. Thus it is not surprising that 
varying interpretations of this status have developed. In addition, the fourth 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
In Muslim countries where polygyny is abolished or restricted, the justification for 
such measures is said to come from a stricter interpretation of the Quran and 
emphasis on verse 4.130: "It cannot be that you love your wives equally even if you 
wanted to"; Amelunxen op. cit. note 13 at 89. 
Vieille in Beck and Keddie (eds} 1978 Women In The Muslim World at 464. 
African Women: Their Legal Status In South Africa 1968 at 80. 
See the authorities mentioned in Poulter English Law And Ethnic Minority Customs 
1986 at 45 note 3. 
Op.cit. note 21 at 44. 
Ibid. 
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chapter or sura of the Quran is devoted to women, a significant feature when 
viewed in the context of seventh century patriarchy and misogyny.24 
The Muslim wife is greatly respected and does have some degree of familial 
power as a married woman and mother.25 
Cachalia26 points out that the Islamic faith vastly improved the position of 
women in Arabian society where they were "little more than chattels subject 
to the arbitrary power of their husbands". This is undoubtedly true: female 
infanticide was abolished and women were recognised as persons capable 
of bearing rights.27 The Muslim wife has full legal and contractual capacity, 
and the concept of marital power is not recognised by Islamic law.28 
However, as in any patriarchal society, women can only exercise rights if 
men afford them the opportunity to do so. Youseff29 reports that in traditional 
society men would appropriate the property of their sisters and daughters on 
the grounds that it would be used to provide economic support for the 
women in case of divorce or widowhood. Even in countries where legislation 
was passed to improve the position of women "because of their customary 
seclusion, women were quite likely to be totally ignorant of their rights under 
the new legislation, and even if they should be aware of them it would take a 
good deal of courage to run the gauntlet of the various social pressures and 
sanctions that would undoubtedly face any women insisting upon these 
rights in a court of law".30 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Islamic law evolved in the seventh century of the Common Era (CE) in the 
predominantly urban environment of the Arabian peninsula and lower Mesopotamia. 
The two primary sources of Islamic law, the Quran and Sunna, developed during the 
23 years of Muhammad's prophethood. (See Moosa in Liebenberg (ed) 1995 The 
Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective at 169-170). 
Youseff in Beck and Keddie (eds) 1978 Women In The Muslim World at 84. 
Op.cit. note 9 at 401. 
Ibid. 
Op.cit. note 12 at 430. 
Op.cit. note 25 at 85. 
Coulson and Hinchcliffe in Beck and Keddie (eds) 1978 Women In The Muslim World 
at48. 
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Polygyny cannot be seen in isolation from other practices affecting the 
Muslim wife: 
• Apart from the fact that the man is permitted to marry up to four women 
under certain circumstances, to conclude a marriage contract the woman 
relies on a male representative who has some authority in shaping the 
agreement, although the bride's wishes are to be respected. 
• With regard to divorce, the husband can unilaterally repudiate their 
marriage, while she may only be granted a divorce on certain grounds.31 
• Muslim marriages are automatically out of community of property. The 
spouses do not share profit and loss, nor the accrual that each one's 
separate estate shows. 32 The wife retains full ownership of all property 
acquired before the marriage and has full legal capacity to deal with any 
property, to conclude contracts and to litigate without the assistance of 
her husband.33 The concept of marital power34 is completely alien to 
Islamic law. 
• Apart from exclusive property rights, a wife has a right to all the basic 
necessities of life, which include food, clothing and shelter. It is therefore 
the duty of the father, husband, son or brother, as the case may be, to 
maintain the woman.35 
• On dissolution of the marriage, the wife has to observe a three-month 
period of confinement, ostensibly to protect her reputation and to 
conclusively decide paternity in the event of an undetected pregnancy at 
the time of the divorce. The husband can remarry immediately.36 The 
husband need only pay maintenance to his ex-wife during this three-
month period, or if she is pregnant, until delivery of the child. In the 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
"Talaaq" signifies the absolute right of a man to end the marriage without assigning 
any causes thereto. Another way of terminating a marriage is "Khula", which is 
initiated by the wife, but unlike the talaaq, she has to approach a theologian or a 
judicial body with a cause recognised as valid by the Shari'a. The wife may be 
required to surrender her dowry or its value to her husband as compensation. 
See Roodt 1995 Codicil/us at 51. 
See Cachalia op.cit. note 9 at 401. 
As it used to be known before the General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993 
took effect. 
Op.cit. note 32 at 52. 
J. Sadat unpublished paper delivered at Women Lawyers' Association Workshop on 
Women and Religion, March 1994, Durban. 
8 
instance of the divorce initiated by the wife, the husband is not obliged to 
pay any maintenance, not even during the period of confinement. 37 
• On termination of the marriage, the mother is entitled to custody of male 
children up to the age of seven, and female children until the age of 
puberty. Thereafter, custody and guardianship vest with the father.38 
• With regard to succession rights, the heirs are identified and their portions 
are allocated by the Quran. Freedom of testation is limited to only one-
third of the estate. As a general rule, the male heir receives twice as 
much as the female heir of the same degree. This rule extends even to a 
spouse's share in the deceased estate. 39 
Because of the rarity of polygynous marriages and possibly because the 
South African Muslim community is a close-knit and loyal society which has 
been isolated during the years of apartheid, Muslim women involved in such 
marriages have not voiced their opinions on polygyny and its effect on the 
family. 
Most of the approximately 500 000 South African Muslims live in urban 
areas, working as artisans, professionals and merchants.40 South African 
Muslim women have joined the working world for economic reasons, and in 
some instances, because of the desire to pursue a career outside the 
home.41 
These and other factors have contributed to the creation of a society which is 
very different from the one for which a plurality of spouses was designed. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Op.cit. note 9 at 402. 
Ibid. 
See Moosa 1995 Stellenbosch Law Review 420ff. 
Islamic Council of South Africa "Meet the Muslims" 13-15 referred to by Cachalia 
(supra note 9 at 397). 
Ibid. 
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1.4 RECOGNITION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGES IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAw42 
1.4.1 Pre-Union Statutes 
1.4.1.1 Cape Province 
In terms of s4 of the Marriage Act 16 of 1860 marriage officers could be 
appointed to solemnise Muslim marriages. Under the Act a woman married 
by Muslim rites before the commencement of the Act could object to her 
husband's intended marriage to another woman.43 The magistrate's court 
had to allow the objection unless it believed that the present wife's conduct 
would have entitled the man to a decree of divorce or separation if the union 
had been a valid marriage.44 The fact that a second marriage could be 
disallowed did not validate a polygynous union. 
1.4. 1.2 Natal 
Section 1 of Law 19 of 1881 contained a similar provision regarding the 
solemnisation of Muslim marriages by Muslim marriage officers, but no 
allowance was made for the objection of the first wife. Various other statutes 
regulated the lives and marriages of Indian immigrants in Natal. For example, 
in terms of the Indian Immigration Law 25 of 1891: 
• the religious rules of each party determined prohibited degrees of 
relationship; 
• special rules applied regarding divorce on the ground of desertion; 
• limitations were imposed on the right to remarry after divorce; and 
• different grounds for annulment were provided for.45 
42 
43 
44 
45 
The information in the following discussion until the end of paragraph 1.4.2. is a brief 
summary of Kahn in Hahlo South African Law of Husband And Wife 1969 at 592-596. 
para 4 of schedule A to Act 16 of 1860. 
para 18 of schedule A to Act 16 of 1860. 
Other statutes which regulated the lives and marriages of Indian immigrants in Natal 
are the Indian Immigration Law 26 of 1891, Indian Marriages Validation Act 8 of 1944 
and Indian Laws Amendment Act 68 of 1963. 
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1.4.2 The Union of South Africa 
The Indian Relief Act 22 of 1914 provided for: 
• the appointment of priests to solemnise Indian marriages according to the 
appropriate religious rites;46 
• the registration of a monogamous Indian marriage, which became valid 
and binding despite the fact that it was celebrated under tenets which 
permitted or approved of polygyny;47 and 
• the inclusion of the wife to a polygynous marriage under the definition of 
"wife" for the purposes of immigration in the Admission of Persons to the 
Union Regulation Act 22of1913.48 
The Asiatics (Land And Trading) Amendment Act49 was amended by the 
Asiatic Land Tenure Act50 to extend the definition of "Asiatic" to include a 
woman married to an Asiatic, whether or not that marriage was of a 
monogamous nature. Later, the Group Areas Act51 included similar 
provisions. 
Under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, which brought a large measure of 
unification, the above differential pre-Union and other statutes which had not 
been repealed or were not repealed by the Marriage Act of 1961 were 
scheduled for eventual repeal.52 
1.4.3 The Current Position of Muslim Marriages in Statutory Law 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
s1. 
s2 as amended by s2 of the Indian Laws Amendment Act 68 of 1963. But with the 
repeal of this section by the General Law Amendment Act 80 of 1971, this possibility 
no longer exists. 
s3. 
Act 37of1919. 
Act 28of1946. 
Act 41of1950, as amended byAct 77of1957 and Act 36of1966. 
s39(4); (5) read with the Schedule. Note, however, that ss(5) was subsequently 
repealed. 
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Muslim parties can conclude a valid civil marriage if their (monogamous) 
marriage is solemnised by an authorised marriage officer in terms of the 
Marriage Act.53 The Act54 permits the appointment of ministers to solemnise 
marriages according to Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion. 
However, few Muslim priests have registered under the Act, and according to 
the Islamic Council, the reluctance to accept appointments will continue as 
long as the morality of the Muslim marriage is judged according to Christian 
values.55 So the law of the land and the law of the South African Muslim 
community exist side by side in mutual disregard. 
Muslim marriages do however fall within the ambit of statutes that recognise 
marriages in accordance with any "law or custom".56 Since the adoption of 
the interim Constitution57 the Births and Deaths Registration Amendment 
Act58 came into operation. This Amendment Act makes provision for the 
recognition of customary unions concluded according to indigenous law, and 
marriages solemnized according to the tenets of any religion for the 
purposes of the principal Act only. Accordingly, a parent/s married only 
according to Islamic rites, for example, may apply to the Minister of Home 
Affairs to recognise such a marriage, so that the birth of children born of 
such a union may be registered as legitimate.59 
Further, the Divorce Amendment Act60 empowers a court of law to refuse to 
grant a decree of divorce if it appears to the court that the spouses are 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Act 25 of 1961. 
s3. 
Op.cit. note 9 at 399. 
For instance the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
Act 200 of 1993. 
Act 40 of 1996. 
While the amendment clearly does not provide a blanket recognition of religious and 
customary marriages, it marks a drastic change from the previous position in that it 
opens the way for legitimising children born of such unions. The amendment does 
not distinguish between monogamous and polygamous unions, so that even a child 
born of a polygynous marriage may on application be registered as a legitimate child. 
Act 95 of 1996. 
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bound by their religion to effect a divorce in accordance with the said 
religion. 61 
1.4.4 Case Law 
Early cases62 dealing with Muslim and Hindu marriages adopted the religious 
argument used in the English case of Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee: 63 
"Marriage as understood in Christendom, may ... 
be defined as a voluntary union for life of one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all others." 
In later cases the religious and moral tone gave way to the argument that 
such marriages should not be regarded as valid because they are 
inconsistent with the accepted notion of equality between spouses.64 This 
quest for equality and Christian ideals has unfortunate implications, 
particularly for the female spouse: 
• in law, the spouses are effectively treated as strangers with the result that 
there is no legal nexus between them; 
• the spouses have no reciprocal maintenance obligations during or after 
the marriage; the provisions of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act65 are not applicable to a surviving spouse; 
• 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
any nuptial agreement is void;66 
While the amendment was aimed primarily at Jewish divorces, it may have some, 
albeit limited, effect on Muslim divorces as well, especially where the divorce is 
initiated by the wife, and the husband refuses to agree to it. 
For example Bronn v Fritz Bronn's Executors 1860 Searle at 313; R v Nalana 1907 
TS at 407. 
1866 LR 1 P & D at 130, (1861-73) II ER Rep at 175. 
For example Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) and the obiter dictum in Kalla and 
Another v The Master and Others 1994 (4) BCLR 79 {T). 
Act 27 of 1990. 
Cachalia op.cit. note 9 at 399 also notes that no joint estate will result from the 
marriage, but, with respect, this should probably not be included as a consequence 
of non-recognition. Muslim marriages are automatically out of community of property 
(Cachalia at 401) and if they were to be recognised as part of the system of Muslim 
personal law, joint estates would still not arise. 
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• although both parties may inherit from each other in terms of Islamic law, 
neither acquires interest in the property of the other spouse by virtue of 
the simple fact of marriage;67 
• a spouse cannot claim loss of support for the wrongful death of the 
breadwinner because no duty to support is recognised;68 
• in the eyes of the law the wife is considered a concubine. 
South African courts are not completely without sympathy for the position of 
Muslim spouses. Where circumstances permit, the court can find that the 
marriage is a putative one,69 or that a tacit universal partnership70 exists 
between the spouses. Although commendable in that these measures afford 
relief where it would otherwise be unavailable, they can be used only in 
limited cases. 
For a putative marriage to exist, at least one spouse, at the time of 
contracting the marriage, must have been unaware of the defect that renders 
their marriage void and must have believed in good faith that they were 
lawfully married.71 At common law it was further required that all the 
formalities had to have been complied with at the solemnization of the void 
marriage before it could be a putative marriage. Cachalia72 notes that the 
majority of Muslim marriages are not solemnized by authorised marriage 
officers: this constitutes a defect in Muslim marriages.73 There are, 
furthermore, conflicting views on whether a union which was not solemnized 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Moosa op. cit. note 5 at 420ff details the legal consequences of Islamic and South 
African marriages and their effects on the respective laws of succession. If a Muslim 
fails to make a will devolving his property in terms of Islamic law, he is deemed to 
have died intestate in terms of South African law, thereby excluding Islamic law. His 
"wife" could effectively be disinherited in terms of South African law. 
In fact she has no claim against her "husband's" deceased estate since common law 
and statutory references to wife, spouse, or widow are not applicable to her. (see 
Davids v The Master 1983 (1) SA 458 (C)). 
See Moo/a v Aulsebrook 1983 (1} SA 687 (N}. 
See Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 (1) SA 952 (C}. 
Barnard et al The South African Law of Persons and Family Law 1994 at 178. 
1993 THRHR at 399. 
This is not the only "defect". The main "defect" in the case of a Muslim marriage is 
that it does not require monogamy. 
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by a duly appointed marriage officer can qualify as a putative marriage.74 
Sinclair75 supports the view that defects in formalities or the fact that the 
person officiating was not a competent marriage officer should not preclude 
a marriage from being a putative one. 
Clearly the existence of a universal partnership will also provide relief for 
Muslim spouses in certain cases, but such relief will relate to patrimonial 
issues only. The requirements for a universal partnership were confirmed on 
appeal in Muhlmann. 76 They are that (i) each party should bring something 
into the partnership, or bind himself or herself to bring something into it; (ii) 
the venture should be carried on for the joint benefit of the parties; (iii) the 
object should be to make a profit and (iv) the partnership contract should be 
valid. Although the remedy is available, proving the existence of a universal 
partnership could be difficult, especially in the case of Muslim marriages. 
Since a Muslim marriage does not create a joint estate, there is no choice to 
make a formal agreement to share assets and the Muslim wife exercises 
exclusive proprietary rights over her property.77 The relief granted by the 
court in this case does not therefore imply a willingness to recognise the 
Muslim marriage in the context of the system in which it originated; it is 
simply an attempt to prevent injustice. 
More recently, in Ryland v Edros,18 which has been considered to be the 
most important post-apartheid decision to be handed down by South African 
courts since the abolition of the death penalty,79 Farlam J of the Cape 
Provincial Division boldly opened the door to the notion of substantive equity 
in Muslim marriages, customary unions and marriages across cultural 
boundaries. The essence of the judgement is that "contractual agreements" 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
See, for example Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage 1996 at 405-406; 
Cronje and Heaton Casebook on the Law of Persons and Family Law 1994 at 281-
287. 
Op.cit. note 74. 
1984 (3) SA 102 (A). 
Op.cit. note 32 at 52. 
1997 (2) SA 690 (C). 
See Mahomed De Rebus, March 1997 at 189. 
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flowing from a marriage which is potentially polygynous in nature will not be 
rendered unenforceable, provided that the terms and obligations were not 
contra bonos mores.80 In theory, the decision in Ryland v Edros81 can 
perhaps be translated as reversing the consequences of non-recognition of 
Muslim marriages which are factually monogamous.82 This means that our 
courts must recognise the nuptial agreement between parties in a 
monogamous marriage as a civil contract, and all the financial obligations 
between the spouses that go with it. Cer:tainly, it was on the basis of cultural 
considerations that Farlam J recognised Muslim marriages which are 
factually monogamous. With respect to the learned Judge, he failed to deal 
with the single most controversial and vexing aspect of a Muslim marriage in 
the modern world, namely the principle of gender equality as a basis upon 
which such marriages are denied recognition. 
80 
81 
82 
At 571 G-H. 
Op.cit. note 78. 
Judge Farlam stressed, however, that what he said did not necessarily apply to 
contractual terms in the context of a marriage that was actually, as opposed to 
potentially, polygamous (573 E-F). 
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CHAPTER2 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NON-RECOGNITION OF MUSLIM 
MARRIAGES BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF GENDER EQUALITY 
Equality between men and women in the family is an issue that has 
increasingly commanded the attention of South African courts and 
lawmakers in recent years. In Ismail v lsmai/33 Trengove J.A. said the 
following: 
"Furthermore, in view of the growing trend in 
favour of recognition of complete equality 
between marriage partners, the recognition of 
polygamous unions solemnised under tenets of 
the Muslim faith may even be regarded as a 
retrograde step; ex facie the pleadings, a Muslim 
wife does not participate in the marriage 
ceremony; and while her husband has the right to 
terminate their marriage unilaterally by simply 
issuing three 'talaaqi', without having to show 
good cause, the wife can obtain an annulment of 
the marriage only if she can satisfy the Moulana 
that her husband has been guilty of misconduct." 
Judging polygyny against the standard of equality between women and men 
may initially seem unproblematic, as it did for Trengove J.A. in lsmai/34 where 
it was held that polygyny is unacceptable. Yet on closer analysis it is not 
easy to justify this conclusion. Recognition of the polygynous marriage does 
not, however, necessarily entail recognition of practices related to the 
marriage relationship. In considering the validity of the marriage the court 
could have distinguished between polygyny per se and certain institutions 
also connected to the Muslim faith. 
83 
84 
Op.cit. note 6 at 1024 G-H. 
Op.cit. note 6. 
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In Kalla and Another v the Master and Others,85 the court suggested that the 
principle of gender equality embodied in the Constitution may mean that 
polygyny is still unacceptable to the mores of South African people. 
Neither court was prepared to analyse exactly what it is about polygyny that 
is discriminatory towards women. This is unfortunate, since such an analysis 
may indicate a solution to the problem of non-recognition of polygynous 
unions. Inequalities related solely to polygyny, and not to the environment in 
which polygyny is practised, could include the fact that the husband may 
unilaterally introduce new wives to the family. 
Kaganas and Murray86 set out further instances of possible discrimination, 
but these are related to the oppressive, patriarchal communities in which 
polygyny operates, and not to polygyny itself. They87 remark that within 
African customary law, for instance, it is difficult to envisage a polygynous 
household in which the husband does not dominate. They consider it 
arguable that polygyny facilitates stereotyping and the objectification of 
women to a greater degree than monogamy does. The authors speculate 
that "symbolically polygyny may have become so closely associated with the 
oppression of women that it could be seen as incompatible with a social 
order in which the liberation of women is a recognised goal". 
Notwithstanding the above, the irony of refusing to recognise polygyny 
because it is associated with the oppression of women, is that the decision 
usually operates in favour of the husband. In /smai/,88 for instance, the claim 
of a Muslim woman for maintenance due to her by her husband was refused 
because of the potentially polygynous nature of their marriage, which was de 
facto monogamous. The decision has been subjected to rigorous criticism. 
85 
86 
87 
88 
1995 (1) SA 261 (T). 
Op. cit. note 2 at 127-128. See also note 31 and following text. 
Ibid. 
Op.cit. note 6. 
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As Kaganas and Murray point out, "the outcome of the case suggests that 
one should be wary of a glib application of the notion of equality" . 89 
Setting aside for the moment the question of whether polygyny is 
undesirable and therefore contrary to the principle of gender equality for 
Muslim women, one might begin by clarifying the concept of "equality" and 
thereafter assessing the meaning thereof in an Islamic framework. 
2.1 Understanding Equality 
The concept of equality implies a comparison, and an assertion that equality 
is denied suggests that one category of people enjoys advantages that 
another category does not. 90 
On the other hand, inherent in the notion of equal treatment or formal 
equality, based on the Aristotelian theory that like persons must be treated 
alike, is the proposition that persons in different situations must be treated 
differently. Feminist writers criticising formal equality point out that men and 
women are not the same, that women should not be made to strive to be like 
men in order to enjoy fair treatment, and that the quest for equal treatment 
has obscured the fact that the legal system is based on a male model. 91 The 
response to such criticism was to try to evolve a theory of "special treatment" 
for women which would accord with the so-called "real" differences between 
the sexes. 
Sinclair92 however cautions against falling into the equal/special treatment 
trap. She points out the dangers of justifying different treatment based on the 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Op.cit. note 2 at 124. Furthermore, Trengove J's use of the principle of equality led 
to an outcome that is prejudicial to women and his decision added to their 
disadvantages. The denial of rights is all the more ironic considering that the plaintiff 
had no prospect of objecting to the social practice that put her at a disadvantage. 
Op. cit. note 2 at 127. 
Sinclair op. cit. note 74 at 53. 
Op.cit. note 74 at 59-60. 
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differences between men and women. Unconscious acceptance of the male 
norm has caused women to fail to notice that difference may be synonymous 
with dominance. 93 
Furthermore, the difficulty of presuming a "fixed reality of gender"94 is that it 
ignores that there are fundamental differences between different groups of 
women. Muslim women's concerns, for instance, are very different from 
those of their White, Western counterparts. South African Muslim women 
experience similar status problems in the private and public spheres of life as 
experienced by their non-Muslim (Western) counterparts but, as members of 
a religious community, they experience another inequality. This double 
inequality has resulted in a dichotomy between their roles as citizens of a 
nation and as members of a religious community. 
MacKinnon95 asserts that for women to continue to affirm difference in order 
to justify special benefits is to affirm the characteristics of powerlessness. For 
her, questions of equality and of gender are questions of the distribution of 
power and of hierarchy rather than difference. The issue to confront is 
domination, not equality analysis. 
I am inclined to agree with MacKinnon, especially in the light of the position 
of Muslim women, because it permits the inclusion of issues96 into the 
equality debate that are kept outside it by the conventional 
sameness/difference approach to sex equality. 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Sinclair op. cit. note 74 at 60. 
Sinclair op. cit. note 7 4 at 57. 
Feminism Unmodified 1987 at 38-39. 
Various Islamic religious practices and customs that privilege men over women come 
to mind. See, for instance the position of women in traditional Muslim society 
(Chapter 1) and the examples cited by Kaganas and Murray (op. cit. note 2) which 
are related to the patriarchal communities in which polygyny operates. See also 2.2 
infra. 
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2.2 Understanding Equality in an Islamic Framework 
In Western culture, sexual inequality is based on belief in women's biological 
inferiority. In Islam there is no such belief in female inferiority.97 On the 
contrary, the whole system is based on the assumption that women are 
powerful and dangerous beings. All sexual institutions (polygamy, sexual 
segregation, etc.,) can be perceived as a strategy for containing their 
power. 98 This belief in women's potency is likely to give the evolution of the 
relationship between men and women in Muslim settings a pattern entirely 
different from the Western one. 
Most scholars will certainly agree with the Pakistani author, Fazlur Rahman, 
who states: 
"The Quran immensely improved the status of the 
woman in several directions but the most basic is 
the fact that the woman was given a fully-fledged 
personality."99 
For example, under pre-Islamic custom, the bride was regarded as an object 
to be purchased. However, under the Quran, the bride is considered a 
person whose consent must be obtained to validate a marriage contract. 
Accordingly, the dower that previously was owed to her father now is owed 
to the bride.100 Because the woman has the right to fully dispose of her own 
property, the dower, in turn, provides her with some independence within the 
marriage and with basic social security in cases of divorce or widowhood. 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Mernissi Beyond the Veil:(Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society) 1987 
at 19. 
Ibid. 
Rahman Islam 1979 at 38. Note that Islam, as a divine system of law, was revealed 
to the Prophet Muhammed at a time when women held a very low status in society. 
Women's rights in a male-dominated culture were virtually non-existent. The advent 
of Islam and the teachings of the Prophet did much to uplift the status of women and 
to dispel the prevailing idea that women were inferior and deserved to be treated 
differently. 
Surah 4:4. 
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Thus, the dower might be thought of as a symbol of the improved social and 
legal status of Muslim women in general.101 
Furthermore, the Quran advocates that women be treated well and with 
kindness. Women are accorded rights and obligations equal to men in many 
areas. Both sexes have equal duties with regard to the observance of 
prayers and fasting, the payment of the poor-tax and the Haj pilgrimage.102 
Equality also prevails with the rights to obtaining an education, acquiring and 
owning property, and engaging freely in economic activity.103 It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that modernist Muslim scholars contend that "Islam 
itself, properly understood, establishes complete equality between the sexes 
and is not necessarily in conflict with the principle of gender equality" .104 
Gender equality, they say, is inherent in Islamic law, but it is a qualified 
equality. It is qualified in the sense that due to the biological differences 
between the two, men and women have different roles in society. They exist 
as complements to each other rather than as competitors. Men and women 
therefore excel each other or are superior to each other in certain respects, 
but in the general affairs of life men are partially, but not absolutely, superior 
to women. 105 This may be attributed to the fact that special rights and duties 
are accorded to men and women within the framework of their special 
responsibilities. 106 
The modernists therefore contend that it is not the spirit of Islam, as revealed 
in its primary sources, that discriminates against women. Rather it is the 
practice of Islam distorted by cultural influences during the centuries of its 
development and its own early re-admission of patriarchy after the death of 
Muhammed.107 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
Bielefeldt 1995 Human Rights Quarterly 587 at 596. 
Sadat op. cit. note 36. 
See para 1 .3 in chapter 1 . 
Moosa in Liebenberg (ed) 1995: The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender 
Perspective at 172. 
Surah II, v 228. 
Surah IV, v 34. 
Op.cit. note 104 at 170. 
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Cachalia 108 further submits that, although it is clear that some Islamic family 
laws are based on a traditional, sex-based distribution of rights and 
obligations within the family, it would be wrong to conclude that Islam and 
gender equality are necessarily in conflict. He believes that the traditional, 
sex-based provisions in the Quran which entrench the husband's 
"leadership" within the family are not legally relevant because they do not 
affect the distribution of rights between the spouses inter se or in relation to 
third parties. According to him there is no legal hierarchy within the Muslim 
family. Patriarchy, for instance, could more correctly be described as a 
feature of the social structure which does not distinguish Islam as a culture 
or legal system. 
On the other hand, the idea of equal rights, regardless of gender, is unknown 
to the traditional Shari'a.109 For instance polygyny, partly designed to provide 
for widows and orphans in a pre-modern society, certainly mirrors the 
inequality between the sexes. Further, to conclude a marriage contract the 
woman relies on a male representative who has some authority in shaping 
the agreement, although the bride's wishes are to be respected; at least she 
has the right to veto an unwanted husband.110 With regard to divorce, the 
husband can repudiate his wife unilaterally. However, many Muslims 
disapprove of this practice and legal reforms in many Islamic countries have 
restricted the husband's traditional right to unilateral divorce while giving the 
wife more rights to demand divorce.111 Nonetheless, the legal regulations in 
matters of divorce still reflect the unequal status of the genders, 
discriminating against women. Finally, the laws of inheritance entitle male 
heirs to twice the share to which female heirs are entitled.112 Islamic law, 
however, accords women the absolute and inalienable right to inherit 
property in terms of the rules of succession promulgated in the Holy Quran. 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
Op. cit.note 9 at 403. 
Op. cit. note 101 at 596. 
Ibid. 
Op. cit. note 101 at 597. 
See op. cit. note 5 at 420; op. cit. note 32 at 52. See, further, the examples cited 
under para 1.3 above reflecting the unequal status of the Muslim wife. 
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According to Roodt, 113 the rights of women in their totality (exclusive 
proprietary rights, right to all the basic necessities of life and the duty of 
males to maintain females) are supposed to balance the inequalities that 
they experience.114 
Because the focus of the Shari'a has always been upon family matters, these 
Islamic family and inheritance laws continue to hold force in South Africa and 
in the vast majority of Islamic countries today. 115 Therefore, several Islamic 
states have entered substantial reservations to the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in particular to 
Article 16 which entails the claim of equal rights for men and women in 
matters of family law and divorce.116 
As argued earlier, the main "defect" in a Muslim marriage is the fact that a 
husband may unilaterally introduce new wives to the family. However, it is 
not entirely clear what aspect of a potentially polygynous marriage is 
supposed to offend against the principle of gender equality. It may be 
argued, for example, that the husband determines the composition of the 
family, that women bear responsibility of the children yet have no rights over 
them, and that the institution allows women to be dominated, sexually 
stereotyped and treated as property. 117 As Kaganas and Murray point out118 
most of these examples simply point to a variety of oppressive, patriarchal 
features of the communities in which polygyny operates, and not to polygyny 
itself. Besides, monogamy is no guarantee of equality either. 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
Op. cit. note 32 at 52. 
For instance, in an Islamic marriage maintenance is the husband's primary 
obligation, regardless of his wife's private means. 
Op. cit. note 101 at 597. 
Apart from family law, the social postion of Muslim women varies greatly from 
country to country. For example, in Saudi Arabia women are not even permitted to 
drive cars, but in the Maghreb states women frequently hold public office. (Mernissi 
Beyond the Veil: (Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society) 1987 xxiv -
xxix). 
Op. cit. note 32 at 57. 
Op.cit. note 2 at 127. 
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It is noteworthy, in this context also to consider the following argument based 
on the Quran: although the Quran permits a man to marry more than one 
woman, it adds the caveat that this may not be done unless the husband is 
able to treat all his wives with full equal justice.119 In another place, however, 
the Quran states that this requirement can hardly ever be satisfied: "You are 
never able to be fair and just as between women, even if it is your ardent 
desire."120 Many scholars, therefore, read the Quran as forbidding polygyny 
implicitly.121 The correct interpretation seems to be that polygyny is 
permissible albeit only conditionally. 
Although the practice of polygyny is on the decline as a result of social and 
economic factors, it remains a sensitive issue in Islam. The reasons 
advanced in defence of polygyny from an Islamic point of view have been, 
first, that it is endowed with Divine authority in the Quran. Secondly, it has 
been argued that polygyny is justified when the wife is barren or unwell 
because, from the husband's point of view, it will enable him to have children 
without discarding his wife. Thirdly, polygyny is defended because it protects 
widows and orphans and caters for the possibility of an excess of women 
over men in time of war by providing them with greater opportunities of 
marriage, maintenance and care than they would otherwise enjoy. Fourthly, 
it is argued that polygyny helps to prevent immorality.122 
Indeed, polygyny provides other benefits for women. 123 It enables co-wives 
to share the burden of domestic work and, in some social contexts, this has 
the added advantage of freeing wives to engage in economic activities 
resulting in greater autonomy because they gain independence. 
119 
120 
121 
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Surah 4: 3. 
Surah 4: 129. 
Op. cit. note 32 at 53; op. cit. note 101 at 611. Up until now, Tunisia is the only Arab 
state that has abolished polygamy completely by making reference to this 
interpretation of the Quran. 
Working paper prepared by research staff of the South African Law Commission 
Project 59, February 1990 at 51 - 52. 
See, generally, Kaganas and Murray op. cit. note 2 at 130 - 131 . 
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CRM Dlamini124 considers polygyny in modern times as a possible 
compromise between a happy marriage and divorce. He rejects the idea that 
polygyny is discriminatory against women, and states that it is calculated to 
protect the woman who cannot find a single man to marry and is prepared to 
settle for a married man.125 Seen in this light, polygyny may not be 
intrinsically detrimental to women but may, on the contrary, actually alleviate 
the hardship they suffer in patriarchal societies. 
However, whether or not polygyny offers benefits to women, it is accepted 
that formal recognition of Muslim family law, based on patriarchy, and 
entailing deep inequalities for women, could create inconsistencies with 
guarantees of equality in the Constitution.126 Equality is strongly emphasised 
in the new Constitution of South Africa, which could provide an opportunity 
for the implementation of a new policy towards such marriages. 
124 
125 
126 
"The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs" in Bennett et al African 
Customary Law at 71. 
Whether such an argument will impress feminists wanting equality between the 
sexes remains to be seen. 
Sinclair op. cit. note 7 4 at 164. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE POSITION OF MUSLIM 
MARRIAGES 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act127 has far-reaching 
implications for many branches of South African law. The Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution extends protection to various cultures and religions. It, inter alia, 
entrenches the following fundamental human rights: firstly, the equality 
clause 128 prohibits unfair discrimination against any person on the grounds 
of, among others, gender, sex, marital status, ethnic or social origin, religion, 
conscience and belief; secondly, section 1 O accords every person the right to 
respect for and protection of his or her dignity; thirdly, s15(1) states that 
everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion; and s15(3) provides for the recognition of marriages and systems of 
personal and family law under any tradition or by persons professing a 
particular religion. 
Together with its enforcement mechanisms, the Bill of Rights also 
concretises values: for instance, in Ryland v Edros129 Farlam J submitted 
that the values of equality and tolerance of diversity, and the recognition of 
the plural nature of our society are among the values that underlie our 
Constitution. The court was undoubtedly influenced by the acceptance by 
our society of the values underlying the new Constitution when it held that 
the Ismail decision no longer operates to preclude a court from enforcing 
claims such as those brought by the defendant in that case.130 
127 
128 
129 
130 
Act 108 of 1996 {hereinafter referred to as the final Constitution). 
s9. 
1997 (2) SA 690{C). Note that the court in this case was not asked to recognise the 
Muslim marriage but merely to enforce certain terms of a contract made between the 
parties. The defendant, in a claim in reconvention based on "the contractual 
agreement" constituted by the marriage by Muslim rites, claimed arrear maintenance, 
a consolatory gift, and transfer {alternatively payment) of an equitable share of the 
growth of the plaintiffs estate. 
at 709C. 
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In South Africa, the constitutional protection of religious beliefs and practice 
has been shown to be an important aim of democratic transformation,131 but 
because religious traditions sometimes place their imprimatur on 
patriarchy, 132 the constitutional recognition of personal legal systems may be 
inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of equality between the sexes. 
The gender implications of the constitution should thus be considered 
carefully, given the fact that Muslim personal law will probably continue to 
have relevance for the Muslim people. 
3.1 Islamic Family Law And The Fundamental Rights Chapter 
A universal right to freedom of religion is declared both by South Africa's 
interim Constitution and by the final Constitution of 1996.133 The provision in 
the final Constitution differs, in certain respects, from that found in the interim 
Constitution. Both Constitutions have general freedom-of-religion provisions, 
which include the cognate right to freedom of conscience and the right to 
freedom of thought, belief and opinion.134 Each also contains specific 
provisions which deal with statutory recognition of religious family law. 
3. 1. 1 Statutory Recognition of Religious Family Law 
Section 14(3) of the interim Constitution provided: 
"Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude legislation recognising 
a) a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing 
a particular religion; and 
b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law 
subject to specified procedures." 
131 
132 
133 
134 
Sees 14(3) of the interim Constitution and s 15(3) of the final Constitution infra. 
Which, as has been shown, entails deep inequalities for women. 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution) 
s14 (1); Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (the final 
Constitution) s15 (1 ). 
s 14( 1 ) of the interim Constitution and s 15( 1 ) of the final Constitution. 
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But s15(3) of the final Constitution stipulates: 
"a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising -
b) 
i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of 
religious, personal or family law; or 
ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or 
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. 
Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this 
section and the other provisions of the Constitution." 
Plurality of family laws is constitutionally entrenched in as much as it permits 
parliament to enact laws which will recognise marriages concluded under 
different systems of religious law or tradition. 135 The guarantee of freedom of 
religion and prohibition against discrimination on the ground of religion 136 
may eventually mean that religious intolerance of polygynous marriages 
could be relaxed by legislation and the courts. 137 The new s15(3), however, 
is slightly broader than the old s14(3). The provision of the interim 
Constitution dealt only with family law of religious inspiration. African 
customary law is now also clearly covered. 138 
Kalla and Another v The Master and Others 139 raised the question of 
whether the non-recognition of potentially polygynous marriages is 
unconstitutional and in conflict with s14(1) of the interim Constitution. Without 
deciding the issue, the court observed that the non-recognition of such 
marriages was "probably not unconstitutional". The court argued that the 
provision sanctioning the enactment of legislation recognising the validity of 
marriages concluded under systems of religious law would have been 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
s14(3} of the interim Constitution and s15(3) of the final Constitution. 
s9(3} of the final Constitution. 
Note that both sections (i.e. s14(3} of the interim Constitution and s15(3} of the final 
Constitution} refer to legislation that must still be promulgated and to date neither 
section has had an effect on the validity of Muslim marriages. See also Roodt op. cit. 
note 32 at 56. 
Smith 1997 South African Law Journal 217 at 222. 
Op. cit. note 85. 
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superfluous had the framers of the Constitution intended that s14(1) should 
effect a validation of such unions. 
Sinclair, 140 commenting on s14(3) of the interim Constitution, states that if 
legislation is passed in terms of s14 recognising, for example the system of 
Muslim personal law, that law would be "immune from attack under the 
Constitution even if aspects of the protected system violate fundamental 
rights by being unfairly discriminatory on the grounds of sex". Even if the 
Constitutional Court had to decide that polygyny is unfairly discriminatory 
towards women, the envisaged legislation would trump the equality clause. 
What s14(3) achieved was the elevation of one aspect of positive freedom of 
religion to a level where it trumped every other provision of the Bill of 
Rights. 141 
Section15(3) of the new Constitution only exempts the type of legislation 
under discussion from challenges in terms of s15: nothing in the general 
provision of s15(1) or 15(2) may be understood to prohibit religious or 
customary family law.142 It is, however, difficult to think of an aspect of 
positive or negative religious freedom that could be restricted by such 
legislation. Statutes dealing with religious family law, for example, are more 
likely, under ss(3)(b ), to face challenges in terms of the equality provision. 143 
Smith 144 therefore argues that with the omission of the general exemption of 
the old s14(3), the new provision is rendered nugatory, as it does not protect 
this type of legislation from any constitutional provision which is likely to 
threaten it. From a gender perspective only, s15(3)(b) of the final 
Constitution thus constitutes a marked improvement. 
140 
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144 
The Law of Marriage Volume 1 ( 1996) at 160. 
Op. cit. note 138 at 222. 
Op.cit. note 143 at 122. 
For example, the argument that polygyny consitutes unfair discrimination, comes to 
mind. 
Op.cit. note 138 at 223. 
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Should the Constitutional Court have to deal with the validity of a Muslim 
marriage before such legislation is passed, it would certainly have to look at 
the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by s15. Another point that may 
be raised is that the current refusal of the legal system fully to recognise 
Muslim marriages amounts to unfair discrimination on the basis of religion, 
which is prohibited by s9 - the so-called equality clause. 
3.1.2 Application of Constitutional Principles 
Cachalia et al145 set out a two-stage approach to be used in applying the 
principles of the Constitution: Is the right which falls within the ambit of the 
Chapter infringed? If so, could that infringement be justified in terms of the 
limitation clause? 
Muslim parties could argue that the refusal to grant recognition to their 
marriage, which is celebrated in accordance with their religious beliefs, is an 
infringement of their right to freedom of religion, and their right to equality. 
Every right in the Bill of Rights is, however, subject to the other provisions in 
the Chapter, in particular, to the limitation clause. Freedom of religion may, 
under the final Constitution, only be limited by a law of general application 
which is both "reasonable" and "justifiable" in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 146 Literally, the 
interim Constitution provided better protection. In terms of s33(1)(b)(bb), 
limitations on the right to freedom of religion also had to be "necessary". 
Whether the change will make any difference remains to be seen. Perhaps 
one can simply say it would be unreasonable to limit freedom of religion in an 
open and democratic society unless it was really necessary.147 
145 
146 
147 
Fundamental Rights In The New Constitution 1994 at 111 . 
s36. 
Op.cit. note 138 at 223. 
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Both limitation clauses, 148 however, provide that the right to freedom of 
religion may be limited as long as the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality [my 
emphasis]. Those who oppose the recognition of polygynous unions on the 
grounds that polygyny is discriminatory towards women may be able to rely 
on the emphasis placed on sex equality in the Constitution. 
Apart from the reference to equality in s33 and s36,149 s9(3) of the final 
Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination on the basis of sex. The 
Constitution also provides for a Commission on Gender Equality 150 to 
promote gender equality and to make recommendations regarding legislation 
which affects the status of women. 151 A reference to freedom and equality 
has been added in both s1 (a) and s7(1) which are foundational to the final 
Constitution as a whole and to the Bill of Rights. Of considerable 
significance, however, is the inclusion in s 1 (b) of the final Constitution of 
non-sexism as a value on which the sovereign, democratic state is founded, 
thus elevating the status of the principle. 152 
But it should be noted that equality also requires that every religion be 
allowed to teach and manifest its own doctrines. In terms of s9(3), the state 
may not unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, on the ground of religion. 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
i.e. s33 of the interim Constitution and s36 of the final Constitution. 
Op. cit. note 148. 
s187 of the final Constitution (and s119(3) of the interim Constitution). 
Du Plessis and Gouws 1996 South Afircan Public Law at 472. They note that no 
matter how "gender-friendly" the appearance of a constitutional text, it cannot 
compensate for a lack of appropriate action designed to harvest the benefits of 
gender equality. They base this statement on the fact that the Commission on 
Gender Equality was only appointed nearly two years after the commencement of the 
interim Constitution. They add that this Commission is the only state institution 
supporting constitutional democracy. 
Note that the preamble to the interim Constitution mentions gender equality as an 
important indicator of the need to create a new constitutional order. Although there is 
no such reference in the final Constitution, there is a reference to the improvement of 
the quality of life of all citizens, which could be construed as an oblique intimation of 
the necessity to promote gender, as well as other forms of equality. (See Du Plessis 
and Gouws op. cit. note 151 at 457). 
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The Constitution's commitment to equality could thus also be a justification 
for freedom of religion. 
On the assumption that polygyny is found to be discriminatory and therefore 
incompatible with the notion of sex equality in a democratic South Africa, 
what should the Constitutional Court do? The drafters of the final 
Constitution have ensured that every person's right to hold the foundational 
beliefs which he or she has chosen are accorded equal protection by putting 
this right beyond the reach of any intolerant majority. The task of the courts 
must now be to interpret religious freedom in such a way that all faiths, in 
particular those of minority groups or those which are, for the moment, 
unpopular, have an equal opportunity to flourish. For, according to the 
Quranic teachings, religion is a personal affair between the individual and 
God, so that every one ought to be completely free in choice of faith. 
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CHAPTER4 
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
Despite the absence of persuasive evidence that polygyny inevitably entails 
the oppression of women the difficult question of whether Muslim polygynous 
marriages should be sanctioned by law remains to be addressed. The 
attitude of the legislature and judiciary towards polygyny, and various other 
factors 153 demand a re-evaluation of the policy of non-recognition of Muslim 
marriages. The most important factor, however, is the new constitutional era 
in South Africa. The Constitution 154 makes provision for the recognition of 
group laws. However, where a group law is a religious law, the incorporation 
of personal laws raises issues of religious freedom, equality between the 
sexes and the proper parameters of state action. Even if polygyny were 
found to be inextricably linked to social practices that are oppressive to 
women, there are a number of ways in which the law might respond: 
• polygyny could be directly outlawed; 
• polygynous marriages could be fully recognised by law; 
• the present system of denying full recognition to polygynous marriages 
could be maintained; 155 
• there is a further option, which, in my view, does not warrant much 
consideration, and that is to allow polyandry as a way of silencing 
protests against polygyny on the ground that it promotes sex inequality. 
As Kaganas and Murray156 point out "the notion of a woman acting as 
wife to more than one man suggests greater oppression, not liberation". 
153 
154 
155 
156 
The fact that Muslim personal law remains governed by religion for instance, and 
factors such as the position of women in Muslim marriages, practices sanctioned by 
the Quran, and the organisation of women's lives in accordance with their beliefs 
form an essential backdrop against which the policy of non-recognition of Muslim 
marriages must be approached. 
s 15(3) 
See Kaganas and Murray op.cit. note 2 at 133. 
Op. cit. note 2 at 127. 
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4.1. Prohibiting Polygyny 
As indicated above in Chapter 2, there is only one objection to polygyny that 
could possibly withstand scrutiny, and that is the concern for the subordinate 
position of women involved in Muslim polygynous relationships. It has 
however been made clear that it is difficult to determine exactly what it is 
about polygyny, practised in the religious context in which it originated, that 
undermines the position of women. It could be that it is the social 
environment in which polygyny is practised that is discriminatory towards 
women, and not polygyny per se. Outlawing polygyny would do nothing to 
improve the position of women in such an environment. 
As Sinclair157 correctly points out, in communities in which polygyny is still 
practised, the prohibition of polygyny will not have much effect except to 
"remove from the law's consciousness (and limited protection) those who 
participate (some more truly out of free choice than others) in polygyny. The 
law's message to women would be that they indulge in this prejudicial 
practice at their peril. That message may or may not serve in the future to 
deter them." 
Kaganas and Murray158 feel that it is too optimistic to assume, for example, 
that where polygyny is but one aspect of a system of family law based on 
religion, a community will alter its customs to conform with systems that are 
asserted to be more democratic or less oppressive of women. Accordingly, a 
legal prohibition of polygyny will, inevitably, leave some marriages 
unregulated. 
157 
158 
Op. cit. note 7 4 at 168. 
Op. cit. note 2 at 133. 
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4.1.1. Prospective Prohibition of Polygyny 
Sinclair159 suggests that if the Constitutional Court is asked to determine the 
constitutionality of polygyny, and decides that it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and must therefore be outlawed, the court should refer the 
matter to Parliament in terms of s98(5) of the (interim) Constitution, to order 
that legislation be passed prohibiting polygyny prospectively. She suggests, 
however, that the existing rights of women and children should be preserved, 
and the way in which valid Muslim marriages can be celebrated in future, 
should be set out in the envisaged legislation. 
An objection to this approach rests with the tension between the right to 
equality based on sex and that based on religion within s 9(3) of the 
Constitution. The insistence on monogamy as the legally recognised union 
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others 160 may 
infringe the religion ground of s 9 of the Constitution. In this situation the 
court would be faced with a conflict between protecting equality on the 
ground of sex (which, on the assumption that polygyny is found to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution, would require it to strike down polygyny) 
and preventing discrimination based on religion. Sinclair161 submits that here 
the court should choose to protect sex equality at the expense of religion. 
4.1.2. Unitary Systems of Marriage 
In suggestions about a unitary system of marriage, Albie Sachs 162 excludes 
polygyny. He offers a form of unitary system that would entail the recognition 
of only one form of marriage rite. The advantages of such a system would 
include "non-racialism, national unity and equality between spouses", but 
159 
160 
161 
162 
Op.cit. note 74 at 168. Note that this suggestion was made with specific reference to 
the interim Constitution. 
para 1.4.4 above 
Op. cit. note 7 4 at 170. 
Protecting Human Rights in the New South Africa 1990 at 71. See, further, Sinclair 
op. cit. note 7 4 at 165. 
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"the state would have to denounce religious marriages as superstitious and 
traditional marriages as tribalistic". 163 
Sachs 164 also refers to a more flexible solution using a single marriage law 
based on the essential characteristics of marriage, but allowing marriages to 
be celebrated in accordance with various rites. The only requirements would 
be that the marriage be solemnised by someone authorised to do so, and 
that it be registered. Sachs 165 excludes polygyny from this scenario by 
stating that the essential characteristics of marriage include a monogamous 
relationship. Cachalia 166 agrees with Sachs, but adds that the registration 
should be for administrative purposes only, and should not affect the validity 
of the marriage. 
Although Sachs's proposal permits a broad degree of freedom to pursue 
religious practices, the difficulty with the approach is that it leaves outside the 
protection of family law persons who participate in the practice of 
polygyny.161 
4.2. Recognising Polygynous Muslim Marriages 
4.2.1. Deregulation of the Marriage Relationship 
Labuschagne, 168 in dealing with cohabitation relationships, suggests that the 
marriage relationship should be deregulated. He believes that in the light of 
the current movement towards individual autonomy and freedom of intimate 
association, those who voluntarily enter into polygynous unions should be 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
Sachs ibid. 
Op. cit. note 162 at 72. 
Op. cit. note 162 at 72. 
Op. cit. note 9 at 404. 
Sinclair op. cit. note 7 4 at 165. 
1989 TSAR at 371. 
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free to do so. This is certainly a simplistic solution which would not 
encourage reforms in the field of equality between the sexes. One option 
would be to acquire the formal written consent of the first wife before any 
subsequent marriage may be entered into. It is difficult to imagine how a wife 
could voluntarily agree to polygyny when her husband decides to take 
another wife. Kaganas and Murray 169 validly point out that "a formal 
requirement of consent may be worth very little and we are likely to mistrust 
a wife's consent when it is exacted in a society in which men dominate". A 
further problem with this requirement is that evidential proof of it might be 
difficult to obtain since the communities practising polygyny may be unwilling 
to fulfil the requirement or might simply be unaware of it. This would result in 
the invalidity of any subsequent marriage, thereby prejudicing the new wife 
and her children. It is possible, however, that the marriage could be 
recognised as a putative one. 
4.2.2. Legal Pluralism 
A pluralism of laws 170 can be accommodated in a variety of ways. 
Sachs 171 suggests two forms of legal pluralism. Although he may not have 
intended that they should include polygynous relationships, they may provide 
viable solutions to the issue of polygyny. The first form presupposes a family 
law which would be determined by the personal law of each couple. Parties 
would be able to organise their family lives as they choose, in accordance 
with their own customary or religious beliefs. Their disputes would be subject 
to the authority of traditional and religious leaders. 
169 
170 
171 
Op. cit. note 2 at 128. 
The concept of "legal pluralism" is used here to denote the formal incorporation of 
different systems of personal law within a single jurisdiction. This is also the definition 
which Cachalia (op. cit. note 9 at 408) uses. 
Op. cit. note 162 at 75-76. 
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Sachs 172 suggests another form of legal pluralism in terms of which a state 
system of justice would be responsible for administering family law, but 
judges would be able to apply principles and rules of various marriage 
systems. This approach is used in Tanzania, where there are certain 
minimum requirements in all cases, for example the court will recognise 
talaaq, 173 but the divorce will only take effect once the judge has recognised 
its existence. It would of course be problematic for the court to determine 
exactly which system of law applies. Perhaps the application of choice of law 
rules could assist with this difficulty. At this stage, there are simply too many 
different marriage laws in this country 174 to expect the judiciary to acquaint 
itself with them. Furthemore, it is probably impossible to administer them 
properly and cost-effectively. 
Cachalia 175 suggests that Muslim family law should be codified, and Muslim 
jurists should be appointed as assessors. Codification will be necessary to 
unify different sources of Muslim family law and curtail the court's 
interpretative powers.176 
In addition to the conflicts-of-law problems that the courts will have to decide 
on in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, the courts will, in the light of 
the new constitutionally-based legal order, have to resolve "conflicts of rights" 
in the exercise of their constitutional jurisdiction. The concept of the equality 
of the sexes is no longer a "special characteristic of a particular society, it is 
a universally cherished ideal".177 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
Ibid. 
Unilateral repudiation of his marriage by a Muslim man. 
Op. cit. note 74 at 208. 
Op. cit. note 9 at 410. 
Ibid. This proposal, intended to guarantee religious freedom, could also have the 
unintended effect of curtailing group autonomy. Where a group law is recognised, the 
state acquires authority over its doctrinal development, interpretation, application and 
enforcement. 
Op. cit. note 9 at 411. The United Nations Charter (1945) and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides equally for religious and women's 
rights but neither addresses the issue of a potential conflict between the two kinds of 
rights. Other international measures dealing with women's rights inlcude the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
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Moosa 178 points out that Muslims have varying interpretations of the Bill of 
Rights. Some are of the view that it governs all legislation and others that it 
protects religious provisions and that its equality clause does not cover the 
interpersonal relations of Muslim personal law. She 179 also suggests that the 
best option and solution to the application of Muslim personal law lies in 
codifying Islamic law and enacting a comprehensive bill or "uniform Muslim 
code" applicable to Muslims. Finally, Moosa 180 believes that it is too 
ambitious to expect the process of reform of Muslim personal law to be set in 
motion by a call for the reinterpretation of Islam and the Quran.181 
4.3 Maintaining The Status Quo 
As outlined in chapter 2, the present method of non-recognition of Muslim 
marriages has proved unsatisfactory. The tensions that manifest themselves 
within the various provisions of the Constitution as discussed under para 4.1 
and para 4.2 above apply with equal force should the status quo be 
maintained. Muslim parties to a marriage would still not enjoy the protection 
that s 9 (right not to be unfairly discriminated against on the grounds of, 
among others, religion and sex) and s 15 of the Constitution promise. 
Women are likely to bear the burden of legal isolation and cases such as that 
of Mrs. lsmail182 will continue to occur. 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
(CEDAW) of 1980. Many modern Muslim (e.g. Egypt) and non-Muslim countries (e.g. 
India) are signatories to it but have placed reservations on certain of its Articles 
where it conflicts with Muslim personal law. South Africa has recently become a 
member of the United Nations and a signatory to CEDAW. Although the Bill of 
Rights states (s39) that a court of law must take cognisance of international law 
applicable to the protection of human rights when interpreting its provisions, it 
remains to be seen whether our Constitutional Court will interpret the Bill of Rights 
having regard to the CEDAW provisions. 
Op. cit. note 5 at 419 note 20. 
Ibid. 
Op cit note 104 at 179. 
As was suggested by some academics at a conference on "Islam and Civil Society in 
South Africa" held at the University of South Africa in August 1994. 
Op. cit note 6. 
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However, in considering solutions to the question of non-recognition of 
Muslim polygynous marriages, it is necessary to bear in mind that the entire 
system of Muslim personal and family law could be recognised through 
legislation in terms of s 15 (3)(ii) of the Constitution, 183 and this could mean 
that polygyny would be permitted. Alternatively, Muslim marriages could be 
recognised in terms of s 15(3)(i). 
183 Act 108 of 1996. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr Justice Murphy of the United States Supreme Court made the following 
statement about polygyny: 
"We are dealing here with .. . one of the basic 
forms of marriage . . . The fact that it is 
condemned by the dominant culture ... does not 
alter the fact that polygyny is a form of marriage 
built upon a set of social and moral principles."184 
While I do believe that monogamy should be encouraged, if only to reduce 
the extent of male domination in Muslim societies in which polygyny is 
practised, I cannot agree to the absolute prohibition of polygyny. It is an 
institution which served, and in many areas continues to serve, the religious 
needs of Muslim societies. Muslim polygynous relationships will remain a 
reality regardless of any change in the law and outright prohibition (or 
maintaining the status quo) will continue to cause hardship to those who, 
willingly or unwillingly, participate in such relationships. After all, religion is 
not just a matter of belief, it is a way of life. There is no genuine freedom of 
religion unless there is the freedom to practise the essential tenets of a 
religion. 185 The South African Constitution shows a sensitivity to this 
intepretation in recognising that commitment to the freedom of religion must 
not prevent legislation recognising "systems of personal and family law ... 
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion". 186 
Islamic family law, therefore, should not be forced into a pre-conceived 
human rights mould,187 for, as argued earlier, while it is true that Islamic law 
and Muslim personal law endorses inequality, Islam and gender equality are 
not necessarily in conflict. Polygyny does not have to be inherently offensive 
184 
185 
186 
187 
In United States v Cleveland 329 U.S. 14 (1946) quoted by Glendon State Law and 
Family: Family Law in Transition in the United States and Western Europe 1977 at 
39. 
And polygyny is what the essential tenets of the Muslim religion entails. 
Final Constitution s15(3}(a)(ii). 
Goolam "Islamic family law and the Bill of Rights: a proposal for the final Constitution" 
1996 Journal for Judicial Science at 136. 
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to a woman's right to equality. What is more, staunch followers of Islam 
consider the tenets of their faith superior to the Constitution, and Islam the 
first theoretical and practical design of the idea of human rights.188 This belief 
of the superior nature of religious law has been outlined under para 1.1 in 
chapter one. 
Finally, one should take into account that many Muslims are insecure about 
the relationship between traditional religious norms on the one hand and 
modern legal standards on the other. Many Muslims assert the validity of the 
traditional Islamic Shari'a in principle and, at the same time, seem prepared 
to accommodate pragmatically some political and legal reforms.189 Although 
such pragmatic accommodation is not sufficient to solve the general conflict 
between religious freedom and the right to sexual equality, accommodation 
does provide some intermediate solutions. 
It will do well to take note of the proposals suggested by Cachalia 190 and 
Moosa 191 regarding codification of Islamic law. The answer to the problem of 
non-recognition of Muslim marriages does not lie in adopting a secular 
uniform civil code. Not only will it be rejected by the Muslim community, but it 
has failed to address the plight of women in countries where it does exist.192 
The process of reform needs to be addressed in line with the true Qur'anic 
spirit. 
A certain amount of legislation may be necessary to relieve concerns about 
sex inequality. For example, a statute could require that the wife of an 
existing marriage would have to consent to the second or subsequent 
marriage of her husband, for the latter to be valid in terms of common law. If 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
Op. cit. note 32 at 57. 
See Bielefeldt op. cit. note 101 at 615. 
See para 4.2.2. 
Ibid. 
Moosa "The Interim Constitution and Muslim Personal Law: Whither South African 
Muslim Women?" Summary of paper presented at conference; Towards the Final 
Constitution: A Critique of the Present Constitution from a Gender Perspective - The 
Way Forward. January 1995 University of Western Cape. 
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the husband were to insist on marrying again without his wife's consent, 
which he may do in terms of Islamic law, she could approach the court for 
relief. The court could declare the second marriage invalid, and in doing so 
inform the new wife that she has no rights in the marriage in terms of the 
general principles of South African law. If the first wife is unhappy to accept a 
second marriage, which would still be valid in terms of Islamic law, her only 
solution would be obtain a divorce. 
It seems beyond question that the Constitution cannot protect Muslim 
personal law if the necessary justification and legitimation for such law is 
lacking. It is submitted that Muslim personal law, once in force, should be 
subject to the final Constitution. It is a foregone conclusion that the State has 
undertaken to guarantee freedom of religion and belief only insofar as it does 
not violate other fundamental rights of its citizens. Subjecting Muslim 
personal law to the Bill of Rights will guarantee that whatever the final 
outcome of a code of Muslim personal law will be, it will provide for equality 
between the sexes.193 
As Roodt194 points out, the ideal method of gender role reform is for women 
to put forward their opinions. If women play an active role in formulating their 
rights, the scrutiny of the personal legal regimes likely to be recognised in 
South Africa and their provisions regarding polygyny can take place in the 
proper social and historical context. 
In conclusion, I can find no more eloquent way to state my position than by 
quoting the final passage of an excellent article by Kaganas and Murray: 195 
193 
194 
195 
"Insofar as this paper appears to accept the 
practice of polygyny it may be controversial, but it 
does not intend to take issue with those who point 
to the severe oppression of women in many 
Op. cit. note 192. 
Op. cit. note 32 at 58. 
1991 Acta Juridica at 134. 
polygynous marriages. Instead, it suggests that 
we should re-examine the basis of our objections 
to polygyny and choose our responses carefully. 
Most importantly, perhaps, we believe that, until a 
great deal more attention has been paid to the 
real conditions of women in polygynous 
relationships and options for addressing them, we 
should be extremely cautious in identifying 
polygyny as the cause of oppression." 
44 
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